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Full text of "Poland Russia and Great Britain 1941-1945"

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from any restoration of the Polish Republic, London decided to recognise
as Poland's representatives, only those who were prepared to comply
with its wishes, i.e., to renounce half Poland and release England from
her commitments.
The fact that Russia had intimated that the fate of Poland also concerned
the Atlantic Democracies was of relative value—although it meant
they had the right to intervene regarding that country if they so wished,
but it was already evident that any intervention concerning Poland on
the part of London and Washington would and did not have the slightest
effect in Moscow. The mild remonstrances coming from the British
and American Foreign Offices over the arrested, deported and murdered
soldiers of the Home Army,, the disappearance of politicians and leading
elements, met with evasiveness or an unwillingness to give any explanation.
The most significant issue of the Crimea was that the Atlantic Democ-
racies in signing the Declaration had voluntarily taken on themselves
a share in the responsibility for the Soviet's action in the countries of
the Middle Zone, particularly with regard to their Allies, Poland and
Yugoslavia—for the mass murders., deportations, imprisonment, and
above all for the creation of the Soviet vassal states, the prelude to the
Soviet Republics west of the c Ribbentrop-Molotov Line.'
It cannot be said that any narrowing of the area of human misery
and suffering, the aim of peace-makers, had been achieved by this step.
A territory of 150,000 square miles east of that * Line ' containing over
23 million peoples in 1939, had been assigned to the Soviet Union,—
in other words written-off the face of the Western world, and an area
west of that 4 Line * four times larger, with a population four times
greater, lying between Stettin and Trieste, i.e. the remainder of-the
Middle Zone was left in the power of the Soviets, in the chains ofc libera-
tion *. Dismissing the Conference, Josef Vissarionovich Stalin might
well have congratulated himself on his astuteness.
The signatories of the Crimea Declaration accepted the ruling that
Poland should receive substantial compensation in the form of territory
in the North and West, but they proved to be in no hurry to define the
extent of this compensation hinting that they might perhaps find something
yet for further bargaining with the Kremlin. Later in his speech Churchill
was to delineate this c compensation' as being the remainder of Upper
Silesia and the southern part of Eastern Prussia, about a quarter the
extent of the territory being torn from Poland on the east. The Soviets,
who then had the * Committee of German Generals * as a potential
Government of Germany and as a threat to the Allies, waiting in the
anti-chamber, were in no hurry to stipulate (except for part of East
Prussia) which German provinces were to be assigned to Poland. They
rather ambiguously referred to them as * lands wrested from Poland by
Germany * and left the ' Lublin Committee * to emphatically and strictly